The Day Greece Said No

From the Mountains of Epirus to the Battle of Crete

28 October 2026 — The 86th Anniversary

Every year, on 28 October, the blue and white flag of Greece appears across Crete. It hangs from balconies and village houses, above shopfronts and public buildings, and along the streets where schoolchildren assemble for the annual parades. Church bells ring, wreaths are laid at memorials, and communities gather to commemorate a decision taken in Athens eighty-six years ago. In the villages of Apokoronas, as elsewhere throughout Greece, Ohi Day is both a national anniversary and an occasion of local remembrance. The names inscribed upon the village memorials belong to families whose descendants still live among us, and the history being remembered is seldom very far away.

Living in Crete, and travelling regularly through its villages and mountains, I have become increasingly conscious of how much of the island’s history is contained within its landscape. There are the military cemeteries at Souda Bay and Maleme, the remains of German defensive positions, the memorials to civilians executed during the occupation, and the mountain tracks once used by resistance fighters, shepherds and Allied soldiers attempting to escape. Some of these places are immediately recognisable; others reveal their significance only when one stops to examine a roadside inscription or to ask why a particular village remembers a particular day.

Yet the events commemorated on Ohi Day began far from Crete. They began in a house in the northern suburbs of Athens, during the early hours of Monday, 28 October 1940, and continued through the mountains of Epirus and Albania, where Greek soldiers fought one of the most remarkable campaigns of the opening years of the Second World War. Among those soldiers were thousands of Cretans who had left their island to join the fighting on the mainland. Many would not return before the German invasion of Crete the following May.

Greece Before the Ultimatum

By the autumn of 1940, much of Europe had already fallen under German domination. Poland had been invaded in September 1939, Denmark and Norway occupied in the spring of 1940, and France defeated in June. Britain remained at war with Germany, while Italy, under Benito Mussolini, had entered the conflict on 10 June 1940, hoping to profit from the apparent collapse of the European balance of power.

Mussolini’s ambitions extended far beyond Italy’s existing possessions. He envisaged Italian predominance in the Mediterranean, the Balkans and North Africa, and regarded the eastern Mediterranean as an essential part of his imperial programme. Greece occupied a strategically important position within that vision. Its mainland and islands controlled approaches to the Aegean, while Crete, lying across the southern entrance to that sea, possessed obvious naval and military significance. Italy already held the Dodecanese, and its occupation of Albania in April 1939 had brought Italian troops directly to Greece’s northwestern frontier.

Greece, meanwhile, was governed by General Ioannis Metaxas, who had established an authoritarian regime on 4 August 1936 with the support of King George II. His government suppressed political opposition, imposed censorship and restricted civil liberties. It was not a democratic government, and its authoritarian character must be distinguished from the national resistance that followed the Italian invasion. Metaxas nevertheless recognised the threat posed by Italian expansionism and understood the importance of British naval power to Greece’s security. He attempted to preserve neutrality while preparing the armed forces for a possible attack.

The strategic difficulty was considerable. Greece possessed a relatively small industrial base, limited financial resources and an army whose mobility depended heavily upon railways, roads, pack animals and the endurance of its infantry. Its northern frontier extended across mountainous country, and the principal approaches from Albania and Bulgaria required different defensive arrangements. The Greek General Staff had undertaken extensive planning, including the construction of permanent fortifications along the Bulgarian frontier, but the country could not defend every possible approach with equal strength.

The Italian occupation of Albania made the danger immediate. From bases in southern Albania, Italian forces could advance towards Epirus and western Macedonia, while Italian aircraft and naval forces threatened Greek communications. Throughout 1940, diplomatic relations deteriorated. Italian propaganda accused Greece of assisting Britain, and a series of provocations increased the pressure upon the Greek government.

On 15 August 1940, during the celebrations of the Dormition of the Virgin Mary, the Greek light cruiser Elli was torpedoed and sunk while lying at anchor off Tinos. The attack was carried out by the Italian submarine Delfino. Nine Greek sailors were killed and others wounded. The choice of date and location added to the outrage: Tinos was, and remains, one of the principal centres of Orthodox pilgrimage in Greece. Although evidence pointed to Italian responsibility, the Greek government avoided publicly identifying the attacker at the time, hoping to prevent the incident from becoming the immediate cause of war.[1]

The restraint achieved little. Mussolini had become increasingly impatient for a military success of his own. Germany’s victories had transformed Europe, while Italy’s achievements remained comparatively limited. Greece appeared to offer an opportunity for a rapid campaign that would strengthen Italian influence in the Balkans and demonstrate that Mussolini was not merely following Hitler’s lead.

It was a profound misjudgement.

Three O’Clock in the Morning

Shortly before three o’clock on Monday, 28 October 1940, the Italian ambassador, Emanuele Grazzi, arrived at the residence of Ioannis Metaxas in Kifisia, north of Athens. He carried an ultimatum from Mussolini’s government demanding that Greece permit Italian troops to enter its territory and occupy unspecified strategic positions. The demands were presented as necessary to safeguard Italian security, but they amounted to a requirement that Greece surrender control over important parts of its own country.

The ultimatum required compliance by six o’clock that morning. Metaxas was therefore given approximately three hours to accept demands whose precise territorial implications the Italian ambassador could not explain. Nor was the Greek government being offered a genuine opportunity for negotiation. Italian formations were already preparing to cross the frontier.

The conversation took place in French, the diplomatic language familiar to both men. According to Grazzi’s subsequent account, Metaxas recognised the meaning of the ultimatum and replied:

“Alors, c’est la guerre.”

“So, it is war.”

The celebrated word Ohi was not necessarily spoken as a single-word reply during that meeting. It emerged as the public expression of the refusal and became the enduring symbol of the national response. Metaxas’s own diary for 28 October records the ambassador’s arrival, the outbreak of war, his communications with the King and British ambassador, and the extraordinary enthusiasm of the population.[2]

At approximately 05:30, before the ultimatum’s deadline had expired, Italian troops began crossing the frontier from Albania. The invasion had commenced. News spread rapidly through Athens and across the country. Reservists reported for duty, railway stations filled with departing soldiers and their families, and crowds gathered in the streets. Greece was politically divided, and opposition to the Metaxas dictatorship had not disappeared, but the invasion produced a powerful determination to resist foreign occupation.

The refusal had been delivered by an authoritarian prime minister. The war that followed would be fought by the Greek people.

The Mountains of Epirus

The Italian offensive began in country that was ill-suited to the rapid campaign envisaged by Mussolini. Epirus is a region of steep mountains, deep valleys, rivers and narrow communications routes, where the weather can transform the practical difficulties of movement within hours. In late October, rain and falling temperatures added to the problems facing troops, vehicles and pack animals. The few roads capable of supporting substantial military traffic became particularly important, and control of mountain passes could determine the movement of entire formations.

The principal Italian attack advanced towards the Kalpaki–Elaia defensive position, northwest of Ioannina. Here the Greek 8th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Charalambos Katsimitros, occupied ground selected and prepared before the invasion. Katsimitros had considerable confidence in the defensive value of the position and in the ability of his troops to resist an attack along the available approaches.

The Italians possessed advantages in aircraft, armour and certain categories of equipment, but these were difficult to exploit across the mountainous frontier. Their attacks met determined Greek infantry resistance supported by artillery and carefully positioned defensive works. During the opening days of November, the fighting around Kalpaki became one of the decisive episodes of the initial campaign. The Italian advance failed to break the Greek position, and the invaders were unable to secure the rapid passage towards Ioannina that their plans required.[3]

Farther north, in the Pindus Mountains, the Italian 3rd Alpine Division, known as the Julia, attempted to penetrate the Greek defensive system and threaten communications between the Greek forces in Epirus and western Macedonia. The Italian mountain troops were experienced in difficult terrain and initially achieved some success, advancing through sparsely populated country towards the important routes associated with Metsovo.

The danger was serious. A successful Italian penetration might have disrupted Greek communications and forced the withdrawal of formations defending Epirus. Greek forces under Colonel Konstantinos Davakis, commanding the Pindus Detachment, resisted the advance while reinforcements moved into the threatened sector. Davakis was wounded during the fighting, but the Greek counteraction continued, and the Italian division found itself increasingly exposed. Its supply lines were stretched, communications deteriorated, and Greek attacks threatened its flanks and rear.

By early November, the Italian offensive in the Pindus had been defeated. The Julia Division had suffered heavy losses, and the prospect of a rapid Italian victory had disappeared. The Greek Army had achieved something of considerable importance. It had survived the initial assault, prevented the enemy from securing his principal objectives and gained time to complete mobilisation. The initiative was beginning to change hands.

The Cretan Division Goes to War

Among the formations mobilised following the Italian invasion was the 5th Cretan Infantry Division, the V Μεραρχία Κρητών. Its principal infantry regiments were the 14th, based at Chania; the 43rd, based at Rethymno; and the 44th, based at Heraklion. Its artillery regiment was based at Souda. These were established components of the regular Greek Army, with a defined command structure and responsibility for the defence of Crete.

The division’s position created an immediate strategic problem. Greece required reinforcements for the fighting against Italy, yet transferring the formation to the mainland would remove the principal regular military force from an island of considerable importance to both Greece and Britain. The Greek government therefore sought an arrangement under which Britain would assume responsibility for Crete’s defence, allowing the division to join the campaign in Albania.

On 4 November 1940, the Greek government informed Britain of its intention to transfer the division on that understanding. The British Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, General Sir Archibald Wavell, had reservations about the additional responsibility, particularly given British commitments in North Africa. Nevertheless, the arrangement was accepted, and preparations for the transfer proceeded.[4]

Between 18 and 25 November 1940, the division was transported from Crete to the mainland. According to the Greek military-history figures reproduced in a specialist study of Crete’s defences, the movement involved 566 officers, 18,662 soldiers, 687 animals and 81 vehicles. Greek ships were requisitioned for the operation, which was protected by Greek and British destroyers. The transfer was completed without loss.

The scale of the movement deserves attention. This was not the departure of a few isolated battalions, but the transfer of an established military formation, including its infantry, artillery, transport and supporting personnel. For the families of Crete, it meant the departure of thousands of men into a war being fought hundreds of kilometres from their homes. For the island’s military authorities, it meant that the defence arrangements upon which they had previously depended could no longer remain unchanged.

The Cretan Division joined the campaign in Albania and participated in operations in the mountainous Trebeshina sector. Its soldiers encountered the same severe conditions experienced by the other Greek formations: steep and broken ground, winter weather, difficult supply routes and determined Italian resistance. The division’s contribution formed part of the wider Greek Army effort, and its achievements should be understood within that operational setting rather than treated as a separate Cretan campaign.[5]

The consequences of its departure would become increasingly apparent during the following months. The Greek authorities attempted to organise replacement formations and reinforce the island, but shortages of trained personnel, weapons and equipment remained serious. By the time German forces attacked Crete in May 1941, the principal regular formation formerly responsible for its defence was still absent.

The connection between October 1940 and May 1941 was therefore direct. The Italian invasion compelled Greece to commit its available forces to the mainland campaign. The British undertaking to defend Crete made the transfer possible. When the German airborne invasion came, the island had to be defended without the greater part of the regular military formation around which its earlier plans had been constructed.

The Greek Army Advances into Albania

By the middle of November, the failure of the Italian offensive had created an opportunity for the Greek Army to take the initiative. Mobilisation had brought additional formations into the field, and Greek commanders began preparing operations intended to drive the Italians back across the frontier.

On 14 November, Greek forces launched a major offensive in western Macedonia. The attacks developed successfully, and Italian formations began withdrawing towards positions in Albania. On 22 November, Greek troops entered Korçë, known in Greek as Korytsa, an important town in southeastern Albania. Its capture was a major military and psychological success, both for the troops involved and for a country that had been invaded less than four weeks earlier.

The offensive continued through November and December. Greek forces advanced towards Pogradec, Sarandë and Gjirokastër, while fighting developed across a broad mountainous front. The gains were substantial, although the Italian Army had not been destroyed and continued to receive reinforcements. The advance also brought new difficulties. Greek supply routes lengthened, the available roads became increasingly inadequate, and the weather deteriorated as winter established itself across the Albanian mountains.

The landscape imposed its own conditions upon the campaign. A ridge that appeared close on a military map might require hours of climbing across snow-covered ground. A mountain road could be blocked by a damaged bridge, a landslide or an accumulation of abandoned vehicles. Artillery, ammunition and food had to be brought forward, frequently by mule or on the backs of men, while wounded soldiers had to be carried in the opposite direction.

For the infantry, the fighting was often conducted at close quarters against positions whose approaches were exposed to machine-gun and artillery fire. The capture of a height did not necessarily secure a usable route beyond it, and a successful advance might leave the attacking troops exhausted and unable to exploit their gains.

Nevertheless, the Greek offensive represented one of the first substantial Allied land successes of the Second World War. At a time when German and Italian victories had dominated events across Europe, Greece had stopped an invasion and driven the attacking army back into Albania.

It was an achievement of considerable military importance, although it came at a mounting cost in lives, casualties and physical exhaustion.

The Women of the Pindus

The Greek–Italian War is remembered not only for its soldiers but also for the women of Epirus, whose contribution to the campaign became one of its enduring features. In the mountain villages near the front, women assisted the military supply effort by carrying food, ammunition, clothing and other necessities along tracks inaccessible to vehicles. Some transported loads on their backs; others worked with pack animals, prepared food, cared for wounded men or helped maintain communications between settlements and military positions. The work was physically demanding and frequently undertaken in severe weather.

The Γυναίκες της Πίνδου — the Women of the Pindus — have consequently become an important part of Greek national memory. Their contribution was neither an invention of later patriotic accounts nor a substitute for the work of the military supply services. It was a practical response to the difficulties of sustaining an army in mountainous country.

The women came from communities where agricultural work, carrying loads and travelling difficult paths were already familiar parts of life. During the campaign, those abilities became valuable to the armed forces. Their labour helped maintain the movement of supplies into forward areas and supported soldiers who might otherwise have remained isolated by the weather and terrain. Their place in the history of 1940 is deserved, not because the campaign can be reduced to a single image of women carrying ammunition through the snow, but because the resistance to invasion depended upon the efforts of civilians as well as soldiers.

Winter in Albania

By January 1941, the momentum of the Greek offensive had diminished. Italian reinforcements had strengthened the front, while the Greek Army was increasingly affected by the difficulties of maintaining its forces across extended mountain communications. The winter was severe. Snow and freezing temperatures affected the higher positions, while rain and mud complicated movement at lower elevations. Frostbite, illness and exhaustion became serious problems. Clothing and footwear deteriorated, equipment required constant maintenance, and even the ordinary tasks of supplying food and evacuating casualties could become prolonged operations.

Both armies occupied positions across difficult country, often separated by narrow valleys or exposed ridgelines. Artillery bombardments, patrols, local attacks and counterattacks continued, but neither side could easily achieve a decisive breakthrough. The Greek soldiers had already endured months of fighting. Many had marched considerable distances, fought repeated engagements and spent long periods in positions offering little shelter from the weather. The Italian Army, meanwhile, had been reinforced and reorganised, and Mussolini remained determined to recover the prestige lost during the autumn campaign.

In March 1941, he attempted to do so through a major offensive.

Hill 731 — The Italian Spring Offensive

On 9 March 1941, Italian forces launched Operation Primavera, the Spring Offensive, against selected Greek positions in Albania. Mussolini had travelled to the theatre to observe the campaign and hoped that a concentrated attack would achieve the victory denied to his army during the previous months.

Among the principal objectives was Hill 731, defended by troops of the Greek 5th Infantry Regiment, part of the 1st Infantry Division. The position formed part of the Greek defensive system in the Trebeshina–Bregu Rapit area, where control of the heights was important to the security of the front.

The Italian assault began with an intense artillery bombardment. Shells struck the Greek positions repeatedly, damaging fieldworks, destroying communications and covering the slopes with craters. Infantry attacks followed, supported by further artillery fire and aircraft.

The defenders, including the II Battalion commanded by Major Dimitrios Kaslas, resisted successive assaults. Italian troops attempted to approach and envelop the position, while Greek infantry and supporting artillery fought to prevent a breakthrough. The fighting continued over several days, with repeated attacks and counterattacks across ground that had already been devastated by bombardment.

Hill 731 became one of the most celebrated defensive actions of the Greek–Italian War. Its importance lay not only in the courage of the men occupying the height but also in the failure of the wider Italian offensive. Mussolini had committed substantial resources to an operation intended to break the Greek front. Despite the intensity of the fighting, the Italians failed to secure the decisive success they required.[6]

By the latter part of March, the offensive had lost its momentum. The Greek Army remained in possession of its principal defensive positions, although both sides had suffered heavily. The Italian invasion had failed, the Greek counteroffensive had gained substantial territory, and the renewed Italian attempt to reverse the situation had also been defeated. But the military position was about to change dramatically.

The German Invasion

Germany had regarded Mussolini’s invasion of Greece with considerable irritation. The Italian attack had created a new conflict in the Balkans at a time when Hitler was preparing for operations elsewhere, including the planned invasion of the Soviet Union. The failure of the Italian campaign increased the strategic problem, while British involvement in Greece raised German concerns about the security of the Balkans and the possibility of British air operations against targets of importance to the Axis.

In December 1940, Hitler issued Directive No. 20, setting out preparations for Operation Marita, the German intervention against Greece. German forces subsequently assembled in the Balkans, and the political situation became more complicated following the Yugoslav coup of March 1941.

On 6 April 1941, German forces invaded Greece and Yugoslavia.

For the Greek Army, the situation was extremely dangerous. Much of its strength remained committed against the Italians in Albania, while the German attack developed through Bulgaria and, as the campaign progressed, through Yugoslavia. German formations possessed considerable advantages in armour, motor transport, communications and air power, allowing them to exploit weaknesses and manoeuvre around defensive positions where the terrain permitted.

Along the northeastern frontier, Greek troops occupied the fortified positions of the Metaxas Line. Constructed before the war to defend approaches from Bulgaria, the system consisted of permanent fortifications, underground galleries, weapons positions and supporting works situated across difficult mountainous country.

German forces attacked the line on 6 April. At several locations, including Fort Rupel, Greek garrisons resisted fiercely despite bombardment and repeated assaults. The defensive positions demonstrated considerable tactical strength, but the German advance through Yugoslavia threatened the entire system from the west.

On 9 April, German troops entered Thessaloniki, effectively isolating the Greek forces defending eastern Macedonia. The subsequent capitulation of those forces did not erase the resistance of the forts, but it demonstrated the limits of even strong fixed defences when the wider operational position had collapsed.

British, Australian and New Zealand forces had meanwhile been deployed to Greece under Lieutenant General Henry Maitland Wilson. Their presence reflected Britain’s commitment to assist Greece, although the decision to send an expeditionary force had been made in the knowledge that the available formations were insufficient to guarantee the country’s defence against a major German attack.

The Commonwealth troops fought a series of delaying actions in northern and central Greece, including engagements around Vevi, the Aliakmon line and Thermopylae. German air superiority and mechanised mobility made the withdrawal increasingly difficult, while Greek formations in Albania faced the prospect of having their communications cut by the German advance.

In April, Greek commanders in Epirus negotiated capitulation. Some sought to surrender to the Germans rather than directly to the Italians, whose army they had resisted and repeatedly defeated. The surrender arrangements subsequently involved Italy, but the decisive change in the Greek strategic position had been brought about by German intervention.

The Greek–Italian campaign had not ended in an Italian battlefield victory. It ended because the German invasion made continued Greek resistance on the Albanian front militarily untenable.

On 27 April 1941, German troops entered Athens. The swastika was raised over the Acropolis, and the occupation of the Greek capital began.

Thousands of British Commonwealth troops were evacuated from southern Greece, many of them to Crete. Others were captured or attempted to escape with assistance from Greek civilians. The withdrawal was conducted under difficult conditions, with German aircraft attacking ports, roads and shipping.

The campaign on the mainland was over. The next major battle would be fought on Crete.

Crete — The Island Without Its Division

The situation on Crete in May 1941 was shaped in part by decisions taken during the previous autumn. The departure of the 5th Cretan Infantry Division had removed the island’s principal regular military formation, and efforts to replace it had not produced a fully equipped and trained force of comparable strength.

The Greek authorities had attempted to organise new units, reinforce existing formations and improve the island’s defences, but shortages of weapons, ammunition and trained personnel remained serious. The arrival of evacuated British Commonwealth troops increased the number of men available, yet many had lost equipment during the withdrawal from mainland Greece.

Major General Bernard Freyberg, commanding the Allied forces on Crete, faced the problem of defending a large island with limited resources, inadequate air support and a mixture of formations whose equipment and readiness varied considerably. The principal defensive concentrations were organised around Maleme, Chania and Souda Bay, Rethymno and Heraklion.

Crete’s geographical position made it a valuable objective. Its airfields and naval facilities could support operations across the eastern Mediterranean, and German planners believed that its capture would remove an important potential base for British operations.

On the morning of 20 May 1941, German airborne forces launched Operation Merkur, or Mercury.

Parachutists and glider-borne troops descended around Maleme, Chania, Rethymno and Heraklion. The fighting began almost immediately. New Zealand, Australian, British and Greek troops resisted the landings, while Cretan civilians also participated in the defence.

The German airborne forces suffered severe casualties during the opening stages of the battle. In several sectors, their attacks were contained or defeated, but the struggle around Maleme airfield and Hill 107 proved decisive. The German ability to secure the airfield and bring in reinforcements by transport aircraft altered the balance of the battle.

Fighting continued across western Crete, including the Prison Valley, Galatas and the approaches to Chania. Allied troops eventually withdrew southwards through the White Mountains towards the evacuation beaches at Sfakia. Thousands escaped by sea, but many others were killed, wounded or captured.

By 1 June 1941, organised Allied resistance on Crete had ended.

The absence of the original Cretan Division was an important feature of the island’s military situation, but it would be too simple to suggest that retaining the formation would necessarily have prevented the German conquest. The outcome depended upon numerous factors, including air superiority, command decisions, communications, equipment, naval operations and the conduct of the battle itself.

Nevertheless, the connection with Ohi Day remains substantial. The Italian invasion had taken thousands of Cretan soldiers to the Albanian front. Six months later, the island they had left behind became the scene of a major German airborne assault.

For Crete, the war that began on 28 October 1940 had come home.

Occupation, Resistance and Reprisals

The end of the Battle of Crete did not bring an end to the island’s suffering. German occupation was accompanied by severe reprisals against civilians, particularly in communities where the population had participated in the fighting or was accused of assisting Allied soldiers.

On 2 June 1941, German paratroopers executed male civilians at Kondomari, near Maleme. The following day, German forces destroyed Kandanos in western Crete as part of the reprisals following the invasion. These events became among the most notorious examples of the violence inflicted upon the civilian population during the opening weeks of occupation.

The reprisals continued during the following years. Villages were destroyed, civilians executed, homes burned and families deprived of their livelihoods. German security operations targeted resistance groups and the communities suspected of supporting them. The consequences were felt across Crete, from the coastal settlements to the remote villages of the White Mountains.

Resistance nevertheless continued. Cretan networks sheltered Allied soldiers, gathered intelligence, assisted escapes and supported operations organised in cooperation with British Special Operations Executive personnel. The resistance was not a single unified organisation; it included different groups, individuals and local networks whose political outlooks and methods varied. Their common purpose was opposition to the occupation.

Across mainland Greece, the occupation brought equally grave suffering. The country was divided into German, Italian and Bulgarian zones, and the economy was disrupted by requisitioning, shortages, inflation and the destruction of transport networks. During the winter of 1941–42, famine devastated Athens, Piraeus and other areas, causing widespread death and suffering.

Resistance organisations developed throughout the country, including EAM and its military organisation ELAS, EDES and other groups. Their activities ranged from intelligence gathering and sabotage to armed operations against occupation forces. Political divisions within the resistance were substantial, however, and violent conflict between Greek organisations contributed to the instability that followed liberation.

The occupation also brought the destruction of Greece’s Jewish communities. Thessaloniki, which before the war had possessed one of Europe’s most important Jewish populations, suffered mass deportations in 1943. Tens of thousands of Jews were sent principally to Auschwitz-Birkenau, where the great majority were murdered. Jewish communities elsewhere in Greece were also subjected to persecution, deportation and murder.

These events belong within the history of Greece’s wartime experience. Ohi Day commemorates the refusal of an ultimatum, but the years that followed cannot be understood solely through the military campaigns of 1940 and 1941. The occupation affected soldiers and civilians, Greeks of different political beliefs and religious communities, and families whose losses continued to shape their lives long after the war.

Liberation and the Difficult Return to Peace

German forces withdrew from Athens in October 1944, and the liberation of the capital was greeted with widespread celebration. Yet the country emerged from occupation economically devastated and politically divided. Tensions between resistance organisations, the government and competing political interests led to armed conflict in Athens in December 1944 and contributed to the wider confrontation that culminated in the Greek Civil War of 1946–49.

Crete experienced a different sequence of events. Although much of mainland Greece was liberated in 1944, German forces remained concentrated in an enclave around Chania and Souda Bay until May 1945. The island’s occupation therefore continued beyond the liberation of Athens.

The formal surrender of the German and Italian forces remaining on Crete was signed on 9 May 1945, with hostilities ordered to cease at 10:00 GMT on 10 May. The surviving surrender instrument provides a precise documentary record of the end of organised Axis military control on the island.[7]

For the people of Crete, liberation did not erase the preceding years. Families had lost relatives, villages had been destroyed, and agricultural production and local economies had suffered. The dead required burial, homes needed rebuilding, and communities had to recover from the consequences of occupation. The experience of the war remained present in family memory, in village memorials and in the places where the fighting and reprisals had occurred.

What Ohi Day Remembers

National anniversaries inevitably concentrate complicated events into a few recognisable symbols. The Greek flag, the parades, the wreaths and the word Ohi provide a common language of remembrance, but the history behind them is neither simple nor confined to a single morning.

Ioannis Metaxas rejected the Italian ultimatum, but the resistance that followed was sustained by the Greek people and their armed forces. The soldiers who fought at Kalpaki, in the Pindus Mountains, at Korçë and on Hill 731 came from different parts of the country and from different social and political backgrounds. Some supported the government; others opposed it. Their political differences did not prevent them from defending Greece against invasion.

The women of Epirus contributed through difficult and often dangerous labour. Families endured separation, uncertainty and bereavement. Cretan soldiers fought in the mountains of Albania while their own island prepared for the possibility of attack. During the occupation, civilians suffered famine, imprisonment, reprisals and deportation, while resistance organisations continued the struggle against Axis rule.

The military achievement of 1940–41 should be understood on its own terms. Greece resisted an invasion by a major European power, defeated the initial Italian offensive, advanced into Albania and successfully resisted a renewed Italian attempt to break its front. These were substantial achievements, particularly given the country’s limited resources and the difficulties of the terrain.

It is sometimes claimed that Greek resistance delayed Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union and thereby changed the outcome of the war. The relationship between the Balkan campaign and Operation Barbarossa has been debated by historians, but the evidence does not support attributing the timing or outcome of the eastern campaign to Greek resistance alone. German planning, logistics, weather and other operational factors must also be considered.

The significance of Greece’s resistance does not depend upon such claims. Its military record was remarkable in its own right, and the courage of those who fought requires no exaggeration. Nor should the anniversary obscure the complexities of Greek political history. The Metaxas regime was authoritarian, the resistance was politically diverse, and liberation was followed by serious internal conflict. These facts do not diminish the refusal of October 1940. They place it within the wider history of the country and the people who experienced the war.

The Flags of October

On 28 October, the flags will again be raised across Greece. In the cities, military and school parades will attract large crowds; in smaller towns and villages, the ceremonies will be quieter and more personal. Wreaths will be laid at memorials, prayers offered, and children will stand before the names of men whose lives ended in wars fought long before they were born.

Here in Crete, those names belong to a history that extends from the mountains of Albania to the airfields of Maleme and the villages of the White Mountains. The men of the 5th Cretan Division who left the island in November 1940 could not have known that German parachutists would descend upon their homeland six months later. Nor could the families who watched them depart have anticipated the years of occupation, resistance and reprisals that lay ahead.

The war would carry Greek soldiers far from their homes, bring foreign armies into their villages, and leave memorials whose inscriptions would become part of the familiar surroundings of succeeding generations.

There is something particularly affecting about these memorials in the Cretan countryside. They are not always imposing structures. Some stand beside village squares, others near churches or at road junctions, where ordinary life continues around them. People pass on their way to work, to the fields, to the kafeneio or to neighbouring villages. On most days they attract little attention, but on anniversaries such as 28 October, the names inscribed upon them return to the centre of community life.

The history they commemorate began with an ultimatum delivered before dawn. Its consequences were borne by soldiers in the mountains, by women carrying supplies through the snow, by families waiting for news, and by civilians who endured the years of occupation.

Eighty-six years later, the word remains unchanged.

Όχι.

It was a refusal to surrender national independence under threat of force. What followed was not an easy victory, nor an escape from suffering, but a long and costly struggle in which the Greek people demonstrated extraordinary endurance.

That is the history Ohi Day asks us to remember.

And here in Crete, where the evidence of that struggle remains so close to everyday life, it is a history that deserves to be understood in full.

Footnotes

1. The sinking of Elli. The Greek cruiser was sunk off Tinos on 15 August 1940 by the Italian submarine Delfino. The attack occurred during celebrations of the Dormition of the Virgin Mary and preceded the Italian invasion by approximately ten weeks. See Hellenic Army General Staff, Army History Directorate, An Abridged History of the Greek–Italian and Greek–German War, 1940–1941, Athens, 1997, introductory chapters on Greece’s diplomatic position.

2. The ultimatum and Metaxas’s response. Metaxas’s diary entry for 28 October 1940 records Grazzi’s arrival and the outbreak of war. Emanuele Grazzi’s subsequent account supplies the familiar French wording, “Alors, c’est la guerre.” The distinction between the reported exchange and the later symbolic word Ohi is historically important. See Ioannis Metaxas, diary entry, 28 October 1940; Emanuele Grazzi, Il principio della fine: l’impresa di Grecia, Rome, 1945.

3. The Italian invasion and Greek defence. The principal military reference is the Hellenic Army General Staff, Army History Directorate, An Abridged History of the Greek–Italian and Greek–German War, 1940–1941 (Land Operations), Athens, 1997. This covers the initial Italian invasion, Greek mobilisation, the fighting in Epirus and the Pindus, and the subsequent counteroffensive.

4. The transfer of the 5th Cretan Division. Georges Yiannikopoulos, “Greece and the Defence of Crete, 1939–1941,” Nuova Antologia Militare, Vol. 2, No. 8 (2021), pp. 241–270, especially pp. 243–246. Yiannikopoulos identifies the division’s constituent regiments, the Greek–British defence arrangement and the transfer of the division to the mainland. His study draws upon the Greek Army History Directorate’s official histories and British War Office documentation, including WO 106/3239.

5. The 5th Cretan Division in Albania. Yiannikopoulos, “Greece and the Defence of Crete,” and Hellenic Army General Staff, An Abridged History, 1997. The division participated in operations in the Trebeshina sector. The precise divisional casualty figures have not been included because they have not been independently reconciled from the relevant operational returns.

6. Hill 731 and the Spring Offensive. Hellenic Army General Staff, Army History Directorate, An Abridged History, 1997; and the Army History Directorate’s Greek-language account of the Italian Spring Offensive, 9–26 March 1941. The latter identifies the II Battalion of the 5th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Major Dimitrios Kaslas, among the principal defenders of Hill 731.

7. The surrender of German forces on Crete. Instrument of Local Surrender of German and Italian Forces in Crete, signed 9 May 1945. The document stipulated that hostilities would cease at 10:00 GMT on 10 May 1945. The distinction between the date of signature and the effective cessation of hostilities is retained in the narrative.

Bibliography

Official military histories and primary sources

Hellenic Army General Staff, Army History Directorate. An Abridged History of the Greek–Italian and Greek–German War, 1940–1941 (Land Operations). Athens: Hellenic Army General Staff, 1997.

Hellenic Army General Staff, Army History Directorate. Ο Ελληνικός Στρατός κατά τον Δεύτερο Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο: Ο Ελληνοϊταλικός Πόλεμος 1940–1941 — Η Ιταλική Εισβολή (28 Οκτωβρίου – 13 Νοεμβρίου 1940). Athens, 1960.

Hellenic Army General Staff, Army History Directorate. Ο Ελληνικός Στρατός κατά τον Δεύτερο Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο: Χειμερινές Επιχειρήσεις — Ιταλική Επίθεση Μαρτίου (7 Ιανουαρίου – 26 Μαρτίου 1941). Athens, 1966.

Metaxas, Ioannis. Diary, entry for 28 October 1940.

Grazzi, Emanuele. Il principio della fine: l’impresa di Grecia. Rome, 1945.

Allied Force Headquarters. Instrument of Local Surrender of German and Italian Forces in Crete. 9 May 1945.

Specialist historical studies

Yiannikopoulos, Georges. “Greece and the Defence of Crete, 1939–1941.” Nuova Antologia Militare, Vol. 2, No. 8 (2021), pp. 241–270.

Mehtidis, Alexis. Greek Ground Forces in Crete and Their Small Arms, November 1940–May 1941. Specialist study of the organisation and equipment of Greek forces on Crete.

Beevor, Antony. Crete: The Battle and the Resistance. London: John Murray, 1991.

MacDonald, Callum. The Lost Battle: Crete 1941. London: Macmillan, 1993.

Clogg, Richard. A Concise History of Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; subsequent editions.

Mazower, Mark. Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941–44. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.

Fleischer, Hagen. Στέμμα και Σβάστικα: Η Ελλάδα της Κατοχής και της Αντίστασης, 1941–1944. Athens: Papazisis, 1988–1989.